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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
Klt\1BALL ELEVA TOR COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ELEVA TOR SUPPLIES COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8066 
BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINTS STATED IN ANSWER TO PETITION 
Defendant and appellant Elevator Supplies Company, 
Inc., comes now and respectfully files this Brief in. Answer 
to Petition for Rehearing, and defendant and appellant respect-
fully submits that the decision of this Honorable Court dated 
July 21, 1954, is just and correct, and that the decision is 
predicated upon the facts and rendered strictly according to 
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law. The defendant and appellant alleges that the petition 
for rehearing misstates the facts and misconstrues the decision. 
Said petition is entirely without merit and should be denied. 
Said petition for rehearing is answered under the following 
points: 
1. There was no competent proof of any nimplied con-
tract" to submit to the jury; consequently, there is no basis 
for the contention {(That the Court in its decision on file herein 
has not considered the findings of fact arrived upon by the 
. '' Jury. 
2. There is no substance to the argument of plaintiff 
''That the Court in its decision has made irreconcilable state-
ments relative to the issues.'' 
3. The argument HThat the Court has misconstrued the 
facts in its application of the law and has committed error 
thereby," disregards the admitted facts and the essential ele-
ments of a contract. 
4. The claim ''That through its decision the Court would 
commit an injustice," is specious, since only the plaintiff sought 
to perpetrate injustice. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
THERE WAS NO COMPETENT PROOF OF ANY 
"IMPLIED CONTRACT" TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY; 
CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE CON-
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TENTION nTHAT THE COURT IN ITS DECISION ON 
FILE HEREIN HAS NOT CONSIDERED THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT ARRIVED UPON BY THE JURY." 
The decision of this Honorable Court is inexorably right. 
There is no merit to the petition for rehearing. Plaintiff mis-
. construes the opinion of the Court, and contradicts the record 
on appeal. In declaring that this Court nhas not considered 
the findings of f'act arrived upon by the jury," the plaintiff 
entirely disregards the basic error of the trial judge in sub-
mitting the case to the jury when there was no competent 
evidence of any nimplied agreement." Plaintiff guotes from 
a number of the prejudicially erroneous instructions of the 
trial court, as if it were perfectly proper to invite the jury 
to ignore the admissions made by plaintiff and the stipulations 
of the parties as well as the undisputed fact that defendant 
never told plaintiff that it would refrain from giving anyone 
a bona fide bid. This Court properly held that there was no 
competent evidence of any nimplied agreement not to s:om-
pete," and consequently there was nothing to submit to the jury. 
By its petition for rehearing, plaintiff would have this 
Court disregard all of the elementary rules of contract. Plaintiff 
in effect asks this Court to reverse itself and to hold that an 
"agreement not to compete" can be implied from a series 
of stale unaccepted written offers and other fruitless negotia-
tions which did not even mention the subject of competition. 
The decision is correct, for the evidence demonstrated that 
there was no legal consideration to support any agreement, 
there was never any discussion of the subject, and there was 
no meeting of the minds. The admissions of plaintiff and 
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the stipulated facts as well as other undisputed evidence, were 
all fatal to the contentions of plaintiff that there was some 
kind of an nimplied agreement not to compete with the 
plaintiff." 
There is no substance to the contention that it was 
"understood" that defendant was to submit a "mere estimate 
and not a firm bid" to Utah Hotel Company. Hotel Utah 
had been a customer of defendant for over two years-a fact 
which plaintiff would like this Court to forget. ~laintiff 
itself presented ~he evidence which conclusively proved that 
plaintiff knew Utah Hotel Company wanted a firm bid from 
defendant on the entire modernization project, and that plaintiff 
recognized the right of defendant to submit such bid and 
made no objections to it, but on the contrary told Pacific 
Elevator and Equipment Company that it was all right to 
submit a bid to defendant on a portion of the project, knowing 
that defendant would use such bid in its overall bid. 
Mr. Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, called 
as a witness for plaintiff, not only testified that the bid. sub-
mitted by plaintiff was so unacceptable that he did not care 
to invite Kimball to submit any other bid; but that he asked 
defendant to submit a firm bid on the overall job. He testified 
that he told Mr. Roy C. Smith, district manager of defend-
ant, that he expected defendant to present a straight-for-' 
ward bid which could be accepted by the hotel (R. 248). 
Mr. Charles M. · Henker, who testified for plaintiff, stated 
that defendant asked Pacific Elevator and Equipment Com· 
pany to submit a bid on a portion of the elevator modernization 
on an installed basis; that Mr. Henker said it would be all 
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right nif it is all right with the Kimball Elevator Company," 
as Kimball was the territorial representative of Pacific (R. 
673-674, 688). Mr. Henker also testified that he came to 
Salt Lake City with Roy C. Smith to make a thorough survey 
of the job ( (down to the last detail, preparatory to making 
up a finn bid to Elevator Supplies Company" (R. 676). When 
he arrived in Salt Lake City, Mr. Henker told Mr. Connole 
that he had been requested by Elevator Supplies· Company 
to give a bid on a portion of the Hotel U tab job on an 
installed basis, and that he wanted to be sure that Mr. 
Connole had no objections. Mr. Connole told him that he 
knew that the hotel management had requested additional 
bids (R. 718). In consequence of that discussion, after being 
assured that plaintiff had no objections, Pacific submitted 
to defendant a firm bid dated September 7, 1950 (R. 717). 
Pacific then gave plaintiff a revised bid in view of what Pacific 
and defendant had learned from an inspection of the job 
site, but plaintiff did nothing about the revised bid from 
Pacific. 
Mr. Connole admitted that he told Mr. Henker it was 
all right to submit a bid to defendant (R. 5 72). He also testi-
fied: (!The Elevator Supplies Company requested the informa-
tion from Mr. Henker, and Mr. Henker refused to give it to 
them, until he had my permission and that it was finally under-
stood that I knew they were bidding it" (R. 5 72). He also 
testified that Mr. Henker told him that ((Elevator Supplies 
Company was bidding on this job and had asked Pacific Ele-
vator and Equipment to furnish them a quotation. He told 
n1e that he could not give them a quotation, because we were 
figuring the job and representing them-unless it was with 
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our permission. I told him it was all right" (R. 5 73). When 
asked if Roy C. Smith ever told him that defendant would 
not submit a bona fide bid to Hotel Utah, Mr. Connole 
answered, ttNo" (R. 589). When asked whether he tried to 
keep Hotel Utah from getting a bid o~ the over-all job from 
defendant, Mr. Connole answered: «ti ·was never aware that 
Elevator Supplies would bid the job. I wasn't trying to keep 
them from it" (R. 579). 
Notwithstanding there was no competent evidence of 
any ((implied contract," plaintiff argues in effect that since the 
trial court permitted the jury to ttfind" that a ttcontract" of 
such a nature existed, this Court should uphold the verdict 
which was contrary to the facts and contrary to law. If 
carried to its ultimate conclusion, such an argument would 
dispense with all appellate courts. 
The argument of plaintiff misquotes the decision of this 
Court. Plaintiff makes assertions which are beside the point 
and which are predicated on false assumptions, as illustrated 
by the following comment: 
c c • • • and although the Court further recognizes 
in its decision that Kimball had a right to exact a cove-
nant from Elevator Supplies that it would not compete, 
in consideration of an understanding that Kimball 
would sub-let part of the work to Elevator Supplies; 
and further that it is not only permissible but common 
practice for a wholesaler to contract not to sell to 
retail customers . . . The Court rules against th~ 
plaintiff.'' 
There is no evidence that Kimball Elevator Company 
ever «texacted a covenant from Elevator Supplies that it would 
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not compete." Nor is there any evidence that Kimball ever 
promised to sub-let part of the work to Elevator Supplies 
Company, Inc., when Kimball requested bids. The requests 
for bids will be searched in vain for any such suggestion. No 
such pretense was ever made at the trial. Furthermore, the 
exhibits clearly show that plaintiff generally did not award 
any contract to defendant, notwithstanding the numerous bids 
defendant submitted upon express request of plaintiff. In 
the case of dumb-waiter elevators, Kimball requested bids 
on repeated occasions and always obtained such bids from 
defendant, but Kimball invariably awarded the contracts to 
competitors of defendant. While plaintiff asked defendant 
for quotations on control equipment, plaintiff never at any 
time awarded a contract or purchase order to defendant for 
any type of control equipment. With respect to the Park 
Building job in 1950, plaintiff admitted that it procured suc-
cessive bids from defendant on controls, and on other portions 
of the work; yet, the contract on the controls was awarded 
to Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company. The written 
instruments conclusively demonstrate that in 1950 there could 
not have been any ((understanding" to award defendant the 
portions of elevator construction on which plaintiff asked 
defendant to bid, for the reason that plaintiff awarded nearly 
all of the elevator construction work to Pacific Elevator and 
Equipment Company (of which firm plaintiff was the terri-
torial representative). 
Contrary to the assertions of plaintiff, there was no proof 
of any «(common practice for a wholesaler to contract not 
to sell to retail customers." Plaintiff's own witness, Mr. 
Charles M. Henker, expressly stated that there was no such 
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practice. The argument of plaintiff would not be in point any-
way, for Utah Hotel Company had been and was then the 
customer of defendant, not the customer of plaintiff. Nor 
was there any evidence that defendant was a mere wholesaler, 
nor that plaintiff was a retailer for defendant. Plaintiff was 
not a ((distributor" for defendant in any sense. Likewise, 
there was no evidence that defendant was a nsupplier of 
plaintiff," for the evidence showed that in 23 years plaintiff 
purchased very little from defendant. Plaintiff was not even 
a regular customer. The dealings were only occasional, and 
plaintiff never purchased anything from defendant if plaintiff 
could make a better deal with someone else. Most of de-
fendant's business was with other companies, and that fact 
was known to plaintiff. Although defendant issued catalogs, 
the plaintiff invariably asked defendant to submit written 
bids on equipment, except occasionally in the case of repair 
parts which plaintiff could not purchase from some other com-
pany. In more than 2 3· years, notwithstanding the numerous 
bids submitted by defendant at the specific requests of plaintiff, 
the plaintiff awarded defendant only 7 contracts, one of 
which was later canceled. During all of those years of nego-
tiations, plaintiff did not even hint that it expected defendant 
to refrain from giving an honest bid to someone else. The 
argument of plaintiff ignores the admission of Mr. Connole 
at the trial that the subject of refraining from competition 
was never discussed (R. 632). There was no competent evi-
dence that plaintiff ever asked defendant to refrain from 
giving a bid to any person or to a class of persons. 
This Court did not hold that under the circumstances 
of this case plaintiff could have exacted from defendant a 
10 
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covenant not to compete. However, it is not a question of 
what the parties might have done, but a question of what 
they actually did. In this case the subject of competition was 
never discussed. There was no consideration furnished by 
plaintiff to support any kind of an agreement, express or 
implied; and there was no meeting of the minds on ({refraining 
from competition, for not even the plaintiff ever thought of such 
an idea until suit was instituted. 
Counsel for plaintiff does not point out any competent 
evidence which could possibly spell out any of the essential 
elements of a contract, express or implied. If an ({implied 
contract" could be fashioned out of the nebulous negotiations 
which came to naught-out of expired unaccepted offers and 
other fruitless negotiations, there is no situation in which a 
jury with sufficient imagination could not ((find" a contract 
in spite of the lack of the meeting of minds and the absence 
of consideration and all other essentials of a valid contract. 
The argument of plaintiff also seeks to avoid the uncon-
tradicted testimony introduced by plaintiff which showed that 
the relations between plaintiff and Hotel Utah were unsatis-
factory; that plaintiff had previously installed equipment which 
did not work successfully, and that plaintiff's bid to the hotel 
was not satisfactory in either form or content; and that the 
hotel management was unwilling to communicate further 
with plaintiff, and requested defendant to submit a firm bid 
on the entire modernization project. 
The trial court should have granted the n1otion for a 
directed verdict, inasmuch as there was no competent evidence 
of the meeting of the minds nor of any legal consideration 
11 
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nor any other essential elements of a contract to submit to the 
jury. There was no acceptance of an offer to give rise to a 
contract. Counsel for plaintiff has attempted to supply de-
ficiencies in the evidence by arguments which are contrary 
to the evidence. The decision is right, and the criticism of it 
by plaintiff is without factual or legal basis. 
Point 2 
THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE TO THE ARGUMENT 
ttTHAT THE COURT IN ITS DECISION HAS MADE 
IRRECONCILABLE STATEMENTS RELATIVE TO THE 
ISSUES.'' 
The plaintiff makes the unfounded assertion that this 
Honorable Court t(has made irreconcilable statements relative 
to the issues." Plaintiff makes statements which are irreconcil-
able with the record on appeal. 
On page 10 plaintiff takes issue with this Court for saying 
that tCHotel Utah indicated that it wanted another bid and 
there is no showing that it expected or desired anything other 
than a bona fide one.'' Plaintiff has no basis for complaining 
about that statement in the opinion, for plaintiffs O\vn wit-
nesses proved such to be the fact. Now plaintiff wants to erase 
that fact by saying that the "desires" of Hotel Utah Hwere 
not at issue before the trial court or the jury." Contrary to 
such assertion, the desires of Hotel Utah were very much in 
point. As owner of the property which was to be remodeled, 
Utah Hotel Company had the right to decide what work 
should be done, who should bid on the project and to whom 
12 
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an award of a contract should be made. Utah Hotel Company 
was paying for the work. It had the unquestioned right to 
obtain a bona fide bid frorn defendant with which it had 
been doing business regularly for over two years. Any inter-
ference with such rights of Hotel Utah would be wrongful. 
By saying that {(The Hotel Utah is not a party to this 
proceeding," plaintiff seems to take the position that the rights 
of the hotel company should be disregarded. If there had 
been an agreement such as pleaded in the amended complaint, 
whereby it was alleged that defendant was to submit a bid 
$18,000 or $19,000 higher than the bid previously submitted 
by plaintiff, such an agreement_ would have been collusive 
and void as a fraud against Hotel Utah. Plaintiff, of course, 
went to trial on a theory which contradicted the theory of 
its amended complaint, in claiming that there really was no 
agreement for defendant to submit a bid to Hotel Utah at 
all, but an {(implied agreement" to refrain from submitting 
a bid. Apparently, plaintiff took the position that the mere act 
of submission of a bid by defendant to plaintiff, gave rise to 
an ((implied agreement," although there was no consideration, 
no acceptance of any offer, and no possible contract. Plaintiff 
changed its theory every time it seemed convenient to do so, 
and there was never any substance to any claim made by 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff even tries to contradict this Court on the basis 
of hearsay and other incompetent evidence. For example, 
plaintiff says that Mr. Connole ntold" Mr. Jerry Smith of 
Hotel Utah that the hotel could use a bid from defendant 
"as an estimate." The testimony of Mr. Connole was incom-
13 
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petent as hearsay, for no representative of defendant was 
present. However, even the hearsay evidence does not bridge 
the gap for the plaintiff. Suppose for the sake of argument, 
(contrary to the actual testimony of Jerry Smith, given later) , 
that Mr. Connole had actually told Jerry Smith (building 
superintendent of Hotel Utah, who had no authority to make 
contracts) that Hotel Utah could use the bid it received from 
defendant as "an estimate." Just how could that fetter Hotel 
Utah? Mr. Connole would have been presumptuous indeed 
to make such a statement. And just how could such an alleged 
remark have prevented defendant from submitting a bona 
fide bid as requested by Utah Hotel Company? Defendant 
did not promise to refrain from giving a firm bid. The evidence 
is conclusive that the only kind of a bid solicited by the hotel 
from defendant was a bona fide bid; and since the hotel had 
been a customer of defendant Elevator Supplies Company, 
Inc., for over two years, the hotel management expected a 
straight-forward bid from defendant. Such evidence was pro-
duced by plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Carpenter, manager 
of Hotel Utah. 
Plaintiff tries to infer that someone on behalf of Hotel 
Utah agreed to receive t t a mere estimate'' from defendant. 
Not even Kimball's manager, Mr. Connole, made any such 
claim. Mr. Connole admitted that Jerry Smith stated that the 
hotel wanted a bid from defendant on the entire project. Mr. 
Connole made no pretense that he spoke to Mr. Carpenter, 
who was the only one who could make any contract for the 
hotel. An examination of Mr. Connole's testimony discloses 
that he made no claim to Jerry Smith that there was any 
agreement between plaintiff and defendant which would make 
14 
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it impossible for defendant to submit a firm bid. What Mr. 
Connole attempted to do was to see if he could talk Jerry 
Smith and Hotel Utah out of getting a bid from defendant. 
Mr. Connole suggested that the hotel get a bid from West-
inghouse. He knew the hotel wanted firm bids and not mere 
"estimates." Mr. Connole even resorted to misrepresentation 
by falsely saying to Jerry Smith that it would be useless to 
get a bid from defendant because it tcwould be identical with 
the bid'' submitted by plaintiff. The bid which defendant sub-
mitted was vastly different from the abortive bid submitted 
to the hotel by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff contradicts the record with impunity by claiming 
that Hotel Utah would have ((received identical equipment" 
and a complete renovation at nlower cost" tcif the defendant 
had remained true to its contract and submitted an estimate 
to the hotel rather than its firm quotation.'' 
There was no contract whatsoever, and there was no 
possible meeting of the minds to refrain from submitting 
an honest bid to anyone. Never at any time prior to suit did 
plaintiff even pretend that there was any contract. When 
suit was filed plaintiff alleged an express collusive agreement 
to submit a bid. At the pre-trial conference, plaintiff apparently 
realized that it could not prevail on any claim that there was 
an express agreement for defendant to present a bid, par-
ticularly a bid which would have been collusive and void. 
Plaintiff abandoned the theory of its pleadings and claimed 
an "implied agreement" to refrain from submitting a bid to 
Hotel Utah. Plaintiff abandoned one fictitious claim and 
adopted another which was entirely inconsistent with the one 
15 
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pleaded. In neither case did plaintiff allege any consideration, 
nor ·state a valid contract. 
There is no excuse for plaintiff to say that Hotel Utah 
would have "received identical equipment" "at lower cost" 
if defendant had not submitted a firm bid to Utah Hotel Com-
pany. Plaintiff's abortive bid omitted a number of essential 
items, which refutes the contention that the hotel would have 
received identical equipment at less cost. There was no evi-
dence that the hotel management would accept plaintiff's 
unsatisfactory bid. Plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Carpenter, 
testified that the hotel had had unsatisfactory dealings with 
plaintiff in the past, and that the bid of August 16, 1950, was 
wholly unacceptable to the hotel and the management refused 
to consider it further. He also said the hotel did not care to 
invite Kimball to submit any further bid. Thus, the contention 
that plaintiff would have been awarded the contract is a myth. 
Plaintiff neither had a contract with Hotel Utah nor with 
·defendant. No reasonable mind could possibly reach the con-
clusion from the evidence that plaintiff would have been 
awarded the contract by Hotel Utah. And there was no one 
to blame except the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff also criticizes this Court for saying that defendant 
understood that it was to submit a bona fide bid. The plaintiff's 
own evidence would preclude any other conclusion. Although 
Mr. ·Connole testified that he told Mr. Roy C. Smith, district 
manager of defendant corporation, to submit a "supporting 
bid" to Hotel Utah, when pressed to state what Roy C. 
Smith said in response to the alleged request, Mr. Connole ad-
mitted that he could not remenzber just what Roy C. Smith 
16 
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said to him (R. 5 78). Consequently, there was no competent 
proof that defendant even made a naked promise. 
It is obvious that there was no consideration of any kind 
furnished by plaintiff which could have made any promise 
binding, even if a promise had been made (of which there is 
no competent evidence), and even if such a promise could 
have been legal. Of course, even if plaintiff had asked de-
fendant to submit to Hotel Utah something other than an 
honest bid, such a request could not have imposed any obli-
gation on defendant. Plaintiff had no supervision over the 
affairs of defendant. If Kimball had become so arrogant as 
to attempt to dictate to Elevator Supplies Company, the latter 
certainly would not have had to pay any attention to such 
impudent conduct of Kimball. No one in his right mind 
would have the audacity to say that defendant had a duty 
to give Hotel Utah a dishonest bid. Plaintiff attempts to dig-
nify a fictitious or collusive bid by calling it ttan engineer's 
estimate.'' 
There is no basis in the record for the argument that 
defendant misled the plaintiff. No tort claim was ever pleaded. 
There was no evidence that defendant ever misled the plaintiff, 
and no such claim was made at the trial. As pointed out here-
inafter, the only party guilty of any misleading tactics and 
misrepresentations was the plaintiff. 
The argument that defendant had not previously bid on 
an entire modernization job is irrelevant. It does not show any 
rneeting of the minds to preclude defendant from submitting 
a bid to the owner of property. The evidence was undisputed 
that defendant submitted bids to other firms, and most of 
17 
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defendant's business was with other companies. There is no 
evidence of any meeting of the minds between plaintiff and 
defendant nor any of the other essential elements of a con. 
tract, express or implied; and plaintiff admits there was no 
express contract. 
Counsel for plaintiff says, "We respectfully challenge', 
the findings made by this Court tt in opposition to the con· 
elusions of the jury who had opportunity to peruse the docu· 
mentary evidence." Plaintiff overlooks the fact that it was not 
the function of the jury to construe the written instruments; 
and if the trial court had construed those instruments offered 
by plaintiff according to their tenor, the case would not have 
been submitted to the jury. Those instruments consisted of 
.requests for bids, and written offers which had never been 
accepted. Under no circumstances could any trier of the facts 
acting as a reasonable mind ttfind" an ttimplied contract not 
to compete" from the numerous stale written offers which 
had never been accepted. 
This Honorable Court has not made any "irreconcilable 
statements" relative to the facts ot the applicable principles 
of law. It is the argument of plaintiff in its petition for re-
hearing which is irreconcilable with both facts and law. 
Point 3 
THE ARGUMENT ttTHAT THE COURT HAS MIS-
CONSTRUED THE FACTS IN ITS APPLICATION OF 
THE LAW AND HAS COMMITTED ERROR THEREBY", 
18 
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DISREGARDS THE ADMITTED FACTS AND THE ES-
SENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT. 
Counsel for plaintiff attempts to take issue with this 
Court for holding inadmissible the conclusions of Mr. Charles 
M. Henker. The quoted portions of the testimony of Mr. 
Henker set out on pages 13, to 17 of the petition for rehearing, 
certain! y do not justify any alteration of the decision of this 
Court. The trial court should have sustained the objections 
to the conclusions of Mr. Henker, wherein he stated his ((im-
pressions'' rather than the conversations. Council for plaintiff 
assumes that if a witness says he cannot relate a conversation 
'vord for word, he can draw conclusions and give his nimpres-
sions" instead of relating the substance of what was said by 
the persons involved in a conversation. The text statements 
quoted by plaintiff on pages 18 and 19 do not aid the position 
of the plaintiff, for they are not in point. None of them state 
that a witness can resort to conclusions. 
There is no merit to the contention that this Honorable 
Court has misconstrued the facts in its application of the law. 
Plaintiff appears to be unwilling to deal with the salient facts. 
The testimony of Mr. Benker, which plaintiff neglected to 
quote, illustrates the viciousness of the statement of ((impres-
sions'' and conclusions, for Mr. Henker later admitted that 
Pacific Elevator and Equipment. Company was asked to give 
defendant a firm bid; that it was necessary to make a trip to 
Salt Lake City for that purpose, and that Pacific was unwilling 
to give defendant a firm bid on a portion of the job without 
a clearance from plaintiff, since plaintiff was territorial rep-
resentative of Pacific. 
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The plaintiff sought to establish the untenable claim that 
an implied agreement to refrain from competing with an 
offeree can be created out of a series of expired unaccepted 
written offers and other negotiations which had terminated 
months previously, in which offers and negotiations there was 
not even any hint of refraining from submitting a bid to any-
one else. Such a concept is contrary to elementary rules of 
contract which require an offer to be accepted in order to result 
in a valid contract. It is not the Supreme Court of Utah which 
is in error as inferred by plaintiff. The plaintiff is in error 
for assuming that a contract can be implied from stale un-
accepted offers which do not even suggest that either the 
offeror or the offeree entertained any such idea as contended 
by plaintiff. 
Point 4 
THE CLAIM CCTHAT THROUGH ITS DECISION THE 
COURT WOULD COMMIT AN INJUSTICE," IS SPE-
CIOUS, SINCE ONLY THE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO PER-
PETRATE INJUSTICE. 
In the teeth of plaintiff's own admissions in the record, 
counsel for plaintiff makes the absurd argument that the nun-
disputed facts are contrary to the decision of July 21," and 
that ccthis Court would commit a dire injustice, in that the 
plaintiff would not only lose a contractual right, but also be 
held as a party to a collusive agreement." 
This Court does not deprive plaintiff of any contractual 
right, for no such contractual right as contended for by 
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I I 
plaintiff ever came into existence. Furthermore, this Court is 
entirely right as to what it says about a collusive agreement. 
If plaintiff had entered into an agreement with defendant 
whereby defendant agreed to refrain from submitting a bona 
fide bid to Utah Hotel Company, when both parties knew 
the hotel sought good faith bids, such an agreement would 
have been collusive and void as a fraud on the hotel company 
as owner of the property. That would have been especially 
true in this case where the hotel company had been a customer 
of defendant for over two years, and relied on defendant to 
furnish an honest bid. 
The decision of this Court fosters justice. What plaintiff 
seeks is not justice, but injustice to defendant. Prior to the 
date when suit was" filed, plaintiff never made any claim 
to anyone that there was any kind of agreement existing 
between plaintiff and defendant, express or implied. From 
the time suit was filed until the date of pre-trial conference, 
the only kind of agreement which plaintiff alleged was an 
express collusive agreement whereby defendant supposedly 
promised to submit a bid to Utah Hotel Company in an amount 
$18,000 or $19,000 in excess of the bid previously submitted 
by plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that in t(vio~ation" of such ((agree-
ment'' defendant made a firm bid and accepted an award of 
the contract (R. 34-41). Thus, plaintiff asserted an express 
agreement to submit a collusive bid which was patently void. 
The cases cited by plaintiff on pages 20 and 21 of its petition 
for rehearing, are not in point, for plaintiff alleged matters 
\vhich would show that plaintiff was barred from recovery 
as a matter of law. 
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Obviously, plaintiff did not expect to prevail on any such 
theory. Consequently, at the pre-trial conference plaintiff 
sought to escape from its plea of an illegal collusive agreement 
by asserting something entirely different-an implied agree-
ment to refrain from submitting any firm bid .. Nothing was 
stated which could be construed to amount to legal considera-
tion for any tt implied agreement" of any kind. The trial court 
should have summarily disposed of plaintiff's fictitious and 
illegal claims by granting the motion to dismiss. 
There is no justification for the argument of plaintiff on 
page 21 that ((justice and fair dealing are sponsored" by 
plaintiff's theory of the case. A scheme to submit a fictitious 
bid is fraudulent. Likewise any agreement to prevent an owner 
of property from getting an honest bid is anything but 
((justice and fair dealing." Either scheme would be illegal, 
and give rise to a cause of action in favor of the victim. The 
further assertion on the part of the plaintiff that if the decision 
of July 21 is not reconsic!_ered, uthis court sanctions breach 
of contract, unfair dealing and dishonesty," is downright 
impudent. There was no contract which could possibly be 
breached, since no contract ever came into existence on any 
such subject. 
This Court does not sanction unfair dealing and dis· 
honesty by rendering its decision, but quite the contrary. The 
plaintiff, however, sought to perpetrate injustice by attempting 
to exact thousands of dollars from the defendant by fictitious 
claims, without any semblance of consideration. 
Plaintiff resorted to unfair tactics not only with defendant, 
but also with Hotel Utah. Mr. Connole induced the defendant 
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to submit its bid dated June 14, 1950, by falsely representing 
that Kimball was being awarded the modernizat~on contract. 
Mr. Connole knew that statement was false, and he knew 
that the hotel wanted other bids, and that the hotel manage-
ment had never promised to award the contract to plaintiff. 
When plaintiff learned that the hotel management wanted a 
bid from defendant C>n the entire modernization project, Mr. 
Connole tried to discourage the hotel grom getting such a bid 
by falsely representing that the bid from defendant would be 
identical with the one submitted by plaintiff. The evi~ence is 
conclusive that the bid submitted by plaintiff was· incomplete 
and omitted numerous essential items, and the bid submitted 
by defendant was entirely different, not only as to price, but 
as to substance and form. 
As unsuccessful bidder, plaintiff was guilty of perpetrating 
a series of injustices. First, plaintiff wrongfully attempted 
to exact from defendant as successful bidder, a 10ro "com-
mission" although plaintiff knew defendant had never prom-
ised any commission or any other ((cut," and plaintiff knew 
it was not employed by defendant. When defendant refused 
to submit to such an outrageous exaction, plaintiff tried to 
coax Utah Hotel Company to pay a tccommission" which could 
not have been owing under any possible stretch of the imagina-
tion. When that scheme was rebuffed, plaintiff unconscionably 
attempted to induce Utah Hotel Company to cancel its con-
tract with defendant on the pass.enger elevators and to issue 
a contract for the same price to the plaintiff (R. 590-591, 
238, 240, 250-251, 239-240). Plaintiff admitted that defendant 
never told plaintiff at any time that defendant would give 
plaintiff a ((cut" out of the job if the hotel company awarded 
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the contracts to defendant and that there were no promises 
(R. 589-590). 
Plaintiff made further attempts to perpetrate injustice, 
in the effort to get something for nothing, by filing suit on a 
claim of a purported collusive agreement for defendant to 
submit a bid, and finally by claiming breach of an "implied 
agreement'' not to submit a firm bid. Plaintiff wasted thou-
sands of dollars of the time of the courts as well as subjecting 
the defendant to the unjust burden of defending against spur-
ious claims. 
Defendant has no disagreement with the general rule cited 
by plaintiff to the effect that where a contract exists, which is 
capable of a construction in accordance with fair dealing and 
justice, the courts will adopt such construction. Such rule has 
no application here, for there was no contract of any kind 
since plaintiff did not accept any offer of defendant to bring 
any contract into being. Furthermore, the citations furnished 
by plaintiff to the effect that agreements may be legal if made 
to protect rights and there is no purpose to in jure or defraud 
others, are not in point. There were no contract rights for 
plaintiff to protect; but even if there had been an agreement 
to submit a bid which would not be a firm bid, such an agree· 
ment would have been one to injure or defraud Hotel Utah, 
and the agreement would have been void. However, plaintiff 
had no agreement of any kind with defendant, legal or il-
legal. Plaintiff had no contract rights with Utah Hotel Com-
pany to protect. Plaintiff neglected to submit a bid which 
covered the items required by the hotel, so that plaintiff had 
no hope of being awarded a contract. 
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The conduct of plaintiff in attempting to exact thousands 
of dollars from defendant as successful bidder, by one wrongful 
schetne after another, is reprehensible, to say the least. This 
Court correctly and appropriately ruled against the plaintiff 
in accordance with la\v and in harmony with the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of this Honorable Court is right and just. 
It remedies a grievous injustice. There is neither factual nor 
legal basis for disturbing the decision of this Court handed 
down on July 21, 1954. The petition for rehearing filed by 
plaintiff misstates the facts, misconstrues the decision of this 
Court, and makes unwarranted objections. There is no merit 
to the petition for rehearing, for it does not seek to promote 
justice, but injustice. Said petition for rehearing should be 
denied without further hearing or argument. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL E. REIMANN and 
HOWARD J. CANTUS, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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